Security proof of differential phase shift quantum key distribution in
  the noiseless case by Zhao, Yi-Bo et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
6.
20
00
v3
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
8 O
ct 
20
08
Security proof of differential phase shift quantum key distribution in the noiseless case
Yi-Bo Zhao,1 Chi-Hang Fred Fung,2 Zheng-Fu Han,1 and Guang-Can Guo1
1Key Lab of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, (CAS), Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
2Department of Physics and Center of Computational and Theoretical Physics,
University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China
Differential phase shift quantum key distribution systems have a high potential for achieving high
speed key generation. However, its unconditional security proof is still missing, even though it has
been proposed for many years. Here, we prove its security against collective attacks with a weak
coherent light source in the noiseless case (i.e. no bit error). The only assumptions are that quantum
theory is correct, the devices are perfect and trusted and the key size is infinite. Our proof works
on threshold detectors. We compute the lower bound of the secret key generation rate using the
information-theoretical security proof method. Our final result shows that the lower bound of the
secret key generation rate per pulse is linearly proportional to the channel transmission probability
if Bob’s detection counts obey the binomial distribution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant
parties to share secret keys that are unconditionally se-
cure. Until now, there have been several kinds of QKD
protocols. The traditional BB84 protocol is one based on
qubits, in which Alice sends Bob a sequence of qubits to
establish a secret key [1]. On the other hand, there are
other non-qubit-based protocols, such as the continuous
variable QKD scheme [2, 3, 4]. In these two protocols,
regardless of whether qubit states or continuous states
are used, each state (or state pair) received by Bob di-
rectly gives rise to one bit value. In contrast, in differ-
ential phase shift (DPS) QKD, information is encoded in
the difference between each two adjacent quantum states
[5, 6, 7]. Of the above protocols, the last one is designed
to achieve high speed communication. In Ref. [8], Dia-
manti, et al. have realized DPSQKD with a modulation
frequency of 1 GHz.
DPSQKD is well suited for coherent-state sources as
information is encoded in the relative phases of coher-
ent states. Coherent-state sources can also be used
with other protocols, for example, the BB84 protocol
with phase-randomized coherent states [9] whose per-
formance is substantially improved by the decoy-state
method [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17], the BB84 protocol
with phase-non-randomized coherent states [18], and the
B92 protocol with strong reference pulses [19, 20, 21] (see
also [22]).
The unconditional security of the BB84 protocol is well
discussed (e.g., [9, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]). For the CVQKD
protocols, its security against collective attack is also well
discussed [3, 4, 28]. However, for DPSQKD, we only
know that it is secure against several specific attacks, e.g.,
the beam splitting attack and the intercept and resend-
ing attack [8, 29]. Until now, we do not know whether it
is secure against any quantum Eve even in the noiseless
case. On the other hand, specific attacks on DPSQKD
have been proposed to evaluate upper bounds on the se-
cret key generation rates of DPSQKD [30, 31, 32, 33, 34].
In this paper, we prove the security of DPSQKD
against collective attacks [35] with a weak coherent light
source in the noiseless case. The security in this case fol-
lows from a key result that we will prove in this paper,
namely that Eve’s state is independent of the positions
of Bob’s detected signals. This result makes sense since
the fact that there is no bit error restricts what Eve can
do to Bob’s signals. In particular, she has to ensure that
Bob receives all signals with equal intensities, since sig-
nals with different intensities will result in bit errors with
non-zero probability. Our final result on the lower bound
on the key generation rate is a function of the estimated
parameters of the channel (see Eq. (56)). In order to
understand this result further, we compute this bound by
considering a channel that produces a binomial distribu-
tion in Bob’s detection statistics. Specifically, we show
that the lower bound of the secret key generation rate per
pulse is linearly proportional to the channel transmission
probability (see Eq. (65)).
The only assumptions used in the proof are that quan-
tum theory is correct, the key size is infinite and the
devices are perfect and trusted. Our proof works on
threshold detectors, which are the detectors commonly
used in practice. Furthermore, we do not require quan-
tum non-demolition (QND) measurements. Even though
we consider collective attacks in this paper, we speculate
that it is possible for us to extend our security proof to
the most general attack, namely the coherent attack. An
intuitive justification tells us that Eve cannot get more
information from coherent attacks than that from col-
lective attacks as the key size goes to infinite [36, 37].
For the finite dimension case, there is a exponential de
Finetti theorem that can strictly give this result [38, 39].
However, for DPSQKD, the states sent by Alice are weak
coherent states and thus in theory the dimension of Bob’s
received states may be infinite. Thus, the current de
Finetti theorem cannot be directly applied. On the other
hand, there are three potential ways to solve this prob-
lem. Since in practice the states sent by Alice are weak
coherent states and the probability that Bob gets a large
2photon number is extremely small, it is possible to prove
that Alice and Bob’s states can be well approximated by
states that have a finite support. Then the current de
Finetti theorem can be applied. The second way is to
extend the current exponential de Finetti theorem to the
infinite dimensional case. We can see a hope of this in
Ref. [40]. The third way is to extend the current de
Finetti theorem to the case with finite number of mea-
surement results, since we know that in DPSQKD, Bob’s
measurement results are finite. The work in Ref. [40]
also shows that this way may be viable.
We note that there is also a recent proof [41] on
the DPS protocol. Their proof assumes a single-photon
source and requires QND measurements, whereas our
proof allows a more general weak coherent light source
and does not require QND measurements. On the other
hand, their proof can handle the noisy case and applies
to the most general attack, whereas ours can only handle
noiseless collective attacks.
In the following analysis, we map the traditional DPS
protocol into a big-state protocol and give the security
proof for this big-state protocol. In doing so, we prove a
key result of our paper, which is that Eve’s state is inde-
pendent of the positions of Bob’s detected signals. With
this result and some properties of the mutual informa-
tion, we can upper bound Eve’s information about Alice’s
bit string. Finally, we evaluate the key rate assuming a
typical setting in which the detection statistics follows
the binomial distribution. The security proof method we
employ is the information-theoretical one by Renner, et
al. [37, 38].
II. EQUIVALENT PROTOCOLS
A. Protocol 1 - original protocol
Quantum Phase: 1. Alice sends a sequence of coherent
states, each with amplitude α, but with a randomly
selected phase, |α〉 or | − α〉, to Bob. Then she
records each state with a binary variable xi, by
setting xi = 0 if the i-th state is | − α〉 and xi = 1
if the i-th state is |α〉.
2. Using the Mach-Zehnder (M-Z) interferometers
shown in Fig. 1, Bob measures the phase difference
between every two adjacent states. Bob stores his
measurement result into binary variables yi and zi.
While measuring the phase difference of the i-th
and (i− 1)-th state, if Bob gets a photon count, he
sets zi = 1 and if not, he sets zi = 0. Also, if i =
kN + 1 (k = 0, 1, 2, 3, ...), Bob sets zi = 0. If zi =
1 and the measurement results indicates that the
phase difference is zero, he sets yi = 0; otherwise,
if it indicates a non-zero phase difference, he sets
yi = 1. If zi = 0, Bob sets yi = 0.
Classical Phase: 3. After Bob receives each set of N
states, he announces all zi’s for these N states.
FIG. 1: Illustration of the protocol 1, where the PM denotes
the phase modulator
4. Alice generates another variable li = xi ⊕ xi−1
for i > 1.
5. After many rounds of such communications, Al-
ice and Bob randomly publish some of li and yi
corresponding to zi = 1 to test the bit error rate
(BER) between them.
6. Alice and Bob generate new binary variables uAi
and uBi respectively. Alice sets u
A
i = li · zi. Bob
sets uBi = yi · zi.
7. Alice and Bob estimate the mutual information
between the binary strings ~uA and ~uB conditioned
on Bob’s announcement.
8. Alice announces the error correction information
of binary string ~uA and Bob uses it to reconcile his
string ~uB to the corresponding string ~uA.
9. Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification on
their common binary string ~uA to generate the final
secret key.
Instead of steps 6-9, Alice and Bob can simply discard
the li and yi that correspond to zi = 0, and perform er-
ror correction and privacy amplification on the remaining
sifted bits. This protocol is then equivalent to the original
DPSQKD protocol [5, 7]. In this protocol, Bob measures
the phase difference between every two adjacent pulses.
Thus, it may not be a good idea to try to map them into
single bits and then discuss the security. Here, our basic
idea is to regard N states as one big state and to discuss
the security of this big state. In the following, we will
introduce three protocols that map the above protocol
into a big state protocol, in which Alice sends Bob a big
state and Bob measures it with N equipments. The se-
curity of these three protocols are weaker than the above
one. Thus, if the security of these inferior protocols are
proved, then the security of the above protocol is proved.
B. Protocol 2
In step 1, according to the binary string ~x =
(xkN+1, xkN+2, ..., x(k+1)N ), Alice generates a state
|ΨN~x 〉 =
(k+1)N⊗
i=kN+1
|(−1)xi+1α〉 and sends it to Bob through
N fibers. In the quantum channel, there is a quantum
3FIG. 2: Illustration of Protocol 2, where the QM system is a
quantum memory that stores the N received states and sends
out them one by one.
FIG. 3: Illustration of Protocol 3, where Bob’s measurement
equipment is not shown in detail.
memory (QM) system that separates |ΨN~x 〉 into an N -
state sequence and sends each state to Bob one by one
through one fiber (see Fig. 2). Steps 2-9 remain the
same.
There is no difference between Protocol 1 and Protocol
2 at Bob’s side. The only difference between them is that
in Protocol 1 Alice sends Bob each coherent state one by
one and in Protocol 2 Alice sends them all together. The
QM system that separates the big state into an N -state
sequence can be realized by storing the big state and
sending each state one by one. In Protocol 2, the QM
system can be controlled by Eve. However, it can be seen
that if the QM system is put at Alice’s side and cannot be
controlled by Eve, Protocol 2 is equivalent to Protocol 1.
Therefore, the security of Protocol 2 is weaker than that
of Protocol 1. Therefore the secret key rate of Protocol
1 is no less than that of Protocol 2.
C. Protocol 3
As shown in Fig. 3 in step 2 of Protocol 2, Bob stores
the received pulses in another QM system. After receiv-
ing N pluses, Bob reads out the stored N signals one
by one through N fibers and measures their phase differ-
ences via M-Z systems which should be equivalent to the
measurements in Protocol 1 (these M-Z systems can be
realized by the detection equipments shown in Fig. 4).
It can be seen that if the QM system is at Bob’s side
and cannot be controlled by Eve, then Protocol 3 is the
same as Protocol 2. Since in Protocol 3 this QM system
can be controlled by Eve, the security of Protocol 3 is no
stronger than that of Protocol 2.
FIG. 4: Illustration of Protocol 4, where the delayer generates
the time delay that makes the two pulses meet at the beam
splitter before the detector.
D. Protocol 4
In step 1, Alice generates a state |ΨN~x 〉 =
(k+1)N⊗
i=kN+1
|(−1)xi+1α〉 and sends it to Bob throughN fibers.
In step 2, while receiving this big state, Bob measures the
phase difference between each two adjacent states at the
same time with the equipment shown in Fig. 4. Steps
3-9 remains the same as in Protocol 1.
It can be seen that the only difference between Proto-
col 3 and Protocol 4 is that in Protocol 3 Bob measures
each phase difference one by one, but in Protocol 4 Bob
measures them all together. Since different detectors just
measure different field quadratures, the measurement op-
erators that describe these detectors commute with each
other. Therefore, there is no difference between measur-
ing the phase difference one by one and measuring them
all together. Thus, Protocol 4 is equivalent to Protocol
3.
Since Protocol 4 is inferior to Protocol 1, in the follow-
ing we will prove the security of Protocol 4 first. Then
the security of Protocol 1 follows.
4III. SECURITY DISCUSSION
Here we only discuss the security against the collective
attack under the infinite-key-length case. It means that
Alice sends Bob infinite number of the quantum state
|ΨN~x 〉. We remark that we do not place any restriction
on the block length N , which can be finite. Under the
collective attack scenario Eve attacks each state individ-
ually with the same superoperator and the state Alice
and Bob share is a state that can be written as a prod-
uct state. This means that after Alice sends Bob M big
states, the state Alice, Bob and Eve share can be written
as (ρNABE)
⊗M , where ρNABE is evolved from |ΨN~x 〉. Then
it is enough for us to only discuss the possible attacks to
a single state |ΨN~x 〉 [38]. We also assume that quantum
theory is correct, the device can be trusted and Bob’s de-
tectors are ideal [42]. In the following we assume that ~x,
~y, ~z, ~l, ~uA and ~uB are the binary strings Alice and Bob
obtain from one state |ΨN~x 〉, with ~x = (x1, x2, ..., xN ),
~y = (y1, y2, ...yN ), and similar for the others. Let ~X, ~Y ,
~Z, ~L, ~UA and ~UB denote the variables that can take the
values ~x, ~y, ~z, ~l, ~uA and ~uB, respectively. Let Xi, Yi,
Zi, Li, U
A
i , and U
B
i denote the variables that can take
the values xi, yi, zi, li, u
A
i , and u
B
i respectively. In Ref.
[37, 43], it has been shown that under the infinite-key-
length case the secret key rate is given by the difference
between mutual informations. In the above protocols,
~UA and ~UB are the final variables that are used to distill
the secret keys. Then for Protocol 4, the secret key rate
per big state is given by
G ≥ I(~UA : ~UB|~Z)− S(~UA : E|~Z) (1)
where I and S denote the Shannon mutual information
[44] and the Von Neuemann mutual information [45] re-
spectively. Here the I(~UA : ~UB|~Z) and S(~UA : E|~Z) are
respectively given by
I(~UA : ~UB|~Z) =
∑
~z P (~z)I(
~UA : ~UB|~Z = ~z)
S(~UA : E|~Z) =
∑
~z P (~z)S(
~UA : E|~Z = ~z)
. (2)
Before discussing the properties of these two mutual in-
formations, we introduce the following notations. We in-
troduce vectors w(~z) and ~c(~z) in relation to Bob’s count-
ing results. Let w(~z) denote the weight of ~z, which gives
the total number of 1 in ~z. Let ci(~z) denotes the position
of the i-th 1 in the string ~z.
From step 6, we see that uAi = li · zi. Since if
zi = 0 we have u
A
i = 0, ~u
A can be given by ~uA =
(0, .., lc1(~z), .0, .., lcw(~z)(~z), .., 0). For a given ~z, we can
change the order of elements and write ~uA as ~uA =
(lc1(~z), lc2(~z), .., lcw(~z)(~z), 0, ..0). For convenience, we intro-
duce ~l~z and ~y~z, which are given by
~l~z = (lc1(~z), lc2(~z), .., lcw(~z)(~z))
~y~z = (yc1(~z), yc2(~z), .., ycw(~z)(~z))
. (3)
Then for a given ~z, ~uA can simply be given by
~uA = (~l~z,~0)
where ~0 is the zero vector of length N − w(~z). Now we
introduce random variables ~L~z and ~Y~z of length w(~z) that
take on values ~l~z and ~y~z:
~L~z = (Lc1(~z), Lc2(~z), .., Lcw(~z)(~z))
~Y~z = (Yc1(~z), Yc2(~z), .., Ycw(~z)(~z))
. (4)
Then for a given ~z, ~UA can be given by
~UA = (~L~z,~0) (5)
and similarly we have
~uB = (~y~z,~0)
~UB = (~Y~z ,~0)
. (6)
Now we can rewrite the mutual information given by
Eq. (2) as follows.
I(~UA : ~UB|~Z)
=
∑
~z
P (~z)I(~L~z ⊕ ~0 : ~Y~z ⊕ ~0|~Z = ~z)
=
∑
~z
P (~z)[H(~L~z ⊕ ~0|~Z = ~z)
+H(~Y~z ⊕ ~0|~Z = ~z)−H(~L~z ⊕ ~0, ~Y~z ⊕ ~0|~Z = ~z)]
=
∑
~z
P (~z)I(~L~z : ~Y~z |~Z = ~z) (7)
where H(·) is Shannon entropy [44], in the second line we
have applied the results given by Eq. (5) and (6), in the
third line and forth line we have used the definition of the
Shannon mutual information [44] and in the fifth line we
have used the formula, H(AB|C) = H(A|BC)+H(B|C),
and the fact that the entropy of a given vector is zero and
H(·|~Z = ~z,~0) = H(·|~Z = ~z) (~0 is generated from ~z). In
the same way, we have
S(~UA : E|~Z) =
∑
~z
P (~z)S(~L~z : E|~Z = ~z). (8)
Then from Eqs. (7) and (8), the final secret key rate per
N pulses is given by
G ≥
∑
~z
P (~z)[I(~L~z : ~Y~z |~Z = ~z)
−S(~L~z : E|~Z = ~z)]. (9)
If Alice and Bob just discard all li and yi correspond-
ing to zi = 0, and perform error correction and privacy
amplification to the sifted key, according to Ref. [37] the
secret key in this case is also given by Eq. (9). Therefore,
instead of steps 6-9, Alice and Bob can simply introduce
such post-selection step.
5IV. SECURITY PROOF
Before giving the security proof of the DPS protocol,
we will show the main idea of our security proof. In the
DPS protocol, what Alice sends to Bob are two weak co-
herent states. Since these two states are non-orthogonal
Eve in principle cannot always distinguish them and can-
not always know the phase difference between two adja-
cent pulses. The mutual information per pulse between
Alice and Eve is thus less than one. Bob uses the M-Z
system to measure the phase difference between two ad-
jacent pulses. This system can let Bob definitely know
the deterministic phase difference between the two pulses
with certain probability (Bob can definitely know the
phase difference if he gets a count.). Finally Alice and
Bob only keep the measurement results of the phase dif-
ferences that Bob has good knowledge of. The point is
that either Bob knows that Eve has obtained good infor-
mation on a pulse pair (in which case he has not gotten a
photon count and this result is discarded) or Bob knows
more about this result than Eve does (in which case Alice
and Bob proceed to distill a secret key by applying er-
ror correction and privacy amplification to many of such
result). In the following, we will rigorously prove this
when there is no bit error. First, we prove that under
the no-bit-error case Eve’s state is uncorrelated with the
permutation of ~z, which means that Eve’s state is in-
dependent with the position of Bob’s detections. Then
we show that Eve’s average information about the sifted
keys is only determined by the total number of Bob’s de-
tections. Since the maximum total information Eve gets
from Alice is restricted by Alice’s modulation, through
several properties of the mutual information, we can give
an upper bound to Eve’s information on the sifted data.
Then the security of the DPS protocol under the no-bit-
error case is proved.
Here, we only limit our analysis to the no-bit-error
case. For a collective attack, it is enough to only discuss
the attack for a single communication [37]. Therefore, in
the following we only discuss the possible attacks for a
single state |ΨN~x 〉. Before giving the security proof, we
introduce the following notations. As shown in Fig. 4,
the annihilation operator of the input fields on the i-th
path at Bob’s side is denoted by ai. The vacuum inject
mode on the beam splitter corresponding to the i-th fiber
at Bob’s side is denoted by bi. The output modes to the
detectors that detect the phase difference between the i-
th signal and i− 1-th signal are described by d0i and d1i ,
with 0 and 1 describing the lower and upper detectors
respectively (See Fig. 4). In the following, we denote
the detectors that correspond to the modes d0i and d
1
i by
DET 0i and DET
1
i .
We assume that Bob and Eve’s conditional states con-
ditioned on Alice’s modulation is ρN,~xEB . Now we will prove
that if there is no bit error, the reduced state ρN,~x,~zE ,
which denotes Eve’s conditional state after Bob’s an-
nouncement of detected signals, is independent of the
permutation of ~z. With this result and several proper-
ties of the entropy, we can give a lower bound to Eq.
(1).
A. Permutation invariance of Eve’s state to ~z
In this subsection we give the description of Bob’s mea-
surement first. Then we prove a requirement implied by
the no-bit-error condition. Finally we prove that Eve’s
state is invariant under the permutation of ~z.
From Fig. 4, we can see that the output modes d0i and
d1i can respectively be given by
d1i =
1
2 (ai − ai−1) + i2 (bi + bi−1)
d0i =
i
2 (ai + ai−1) +
1
2 (bi−1 − bi)
. (10)
To simplify Eq. (10) we introduce d˜ji and v
j
i :
d˜1i =
1
2 (ai − ai−1)
d˜0i =
1
2 (ai + ai−1)
(11)
and
vac1i =
i
2 (bi + bi−1)
vac0i =
−i
2 (bi−1 − bi)
. (12)
Since the phase factor i can be absorbed into the an-
nihilation operators, the output modes d0i and d
1
i can
simply be given by
d1i = d˜
1
i + vac
1
j
d0i = d˜
0
i + vac
0
j
. (13)
In our security analysis we can safely assume that Eve
holds the purification of ρN,~xEB . This means that we can
safely assume that ρN,~xEB is a pure state [37]. Let |ΨN,~xEB 〉
denote the pure conditional state Bob and Eve share.
According to the Schmidt decomposition (see, e.g., [45]),
|ΨN,~xEB 〉 can be decomposed into several orthogonal states,
|ΨN,~xEB 〉 =
∑
k
c~xk|ΦN,~xE,k 〉|ΦN,~xB,k〉. (14)
For convenience, in the following we denote the ~l gen-
erated from ~x by ~l~x.
The no-bit-error condition can be described as follows.
If there is no phase difference between the i-th and i−1-th
states, in principle the DET 1i detector should not gener-
ate a count; and if there is phase difference, the DET 0i
detector should not click. It can be seen that this condi-
tion actually requires that the output mode d˜
l¯~xi
i of ρ
N,~x
EB
corresponds to the vacuum state, i.e., d
l¯~xi
i |ΨN,~xEB 〉|vac〉 = 0,
where l¯~xi = l
~x
i ⊕ 1 and |vac〉 describes the vacuum state
injected through the bi mode. Since in Eq. (13), the
annihilation operator vacji (j = 0, 1) acts on the vacuum
state, we can simply discard the vacuum mode. Then the
no-bit-error condition can be rewritten as
d˜
l¯~xi
i |ΨN,~xEB 〉 = 0. (15)
6From Eqs. (14) and (11), we know that Eq. (15) is
equal to
[ai + (−1)l
~x
i+1ai−1]|ΦN,~xB,k〉 = 0, (16)
for arbitrary i > 1 and k. Eq. (16) gives the no-bit-
error condition. This analysis can be summarized by the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1 : If there is no bit error between Alice and
Bob, Bob’s state satisfies
ai|ΦN,~xB,k〉 = (−1)l
~x
i ai−1|ΦN,~xB,k〉. (17)
Since d˜lii =
1
2 [ai + (−1)liai−1], from Eq. (17), we get
d˜
l~xi
i |ΦN,~xB,k〉 = ai|ΦN,~xB,k〉. (18)
Eqs. (15) and (18) give us the relationship between the
input modes and the output modes of the M-Z system
under the no-bit-error case. With this Lemma we can
prove the permutation invariance of Eve’s state to ~z fi-
nally.
Combining Eqs. (17) and (18) and the result that l~xi =
xi ⊕ xi−1, we have
(−1)xi d˜l~xii |ΦN,~xB,k〉 = (−1)xi′ d˜
l~x
i′
i′ |ΦN,~xB,k〉 (19)
for arbitrary i, i′ and k. It can be seen that Eq. (19) can
be generalized to
(−1)xi1+xi2+...+xiq d˜l
~x
i1
i1
d˜
l~xi2
i2
...d˜
l~xiq
iq
|ΦN,~xB,k〉 (20)
= (−1)xi′1+xi′2+...+xi′q d˜
l~x
i′1
i′1
d˜
l~x
i′2
i′2
...d˜
l~x
i′q
i′q
|ΦN,~xB,k〉
for arbitrary integer ip > 1, i
′
p > 1, k and q, where the
subscription p = 1, . . . , q (p comes from ip).
Bob’s measurement is a projection. The detector
DET ji maps the received state into the photon number
space {|vac〉〈vac|, |1〉〈1|, ...}. This projection subspace of
DET ji can be given by
Mapji = {M jiv =
1
v!
(dj+i )
v|vac〉〈vac|(dji )v, |v = 0, 1, ...},
(21)
where v denotes the number of photons received by the
detector DET ji .
Since dji is composed by an operator acting on the re-
ceived state and an operator acting on the vacuum state,
from Eqs. (13), (20) and (21), it can be seen that for
arbitrary integer i, i′, v and k we always have
〈vac|〈ΦN,~xB,k |M l
~x
i
iv |ΦN,~xB,k〉|vac〉 = 〈vac|〈ΦN,~xB,k |M
l~x
i′
i′v|ΦN,~xB,k〉|vac〉
(22)
where |vac〉 denotes the vacuum state injected through
the bji mode and this equality holds for v = 0 because
the modulus of the projection to the vacuum state plus
that to other states equals to one. Since |vac〉 is always a
vacuum state, in the following we just leave it out in our
expression for convenience. Eq. (22) can be expended to
the multi-detection case as follows:
〈ΦN,~xB,k |M
l~xi1
i1v1
· · ·M l
~x
iq
iqvq
|ΦN,~xB,k〉 (23)
= 〈ΦN,~xB,k |M
l~x
i′
1
i′1v1
· · ·M
l~x
i′q
i′qvq
|ΦN,~xB,k〉
where we have introduced subscripts 1, 2, ..., and q to enu-
merate different operators and have omitted the vacuum
state part.
From Eqs. (14) and (23) it can be obtained that
〈ΨN,~xEB |M
l~xi1
i1v1
· · ·M l
~x
iq
iqvq
|ΨN,~xEB 〉
= 〈ΨN,~xEB |M
l~x
i′1
i′1v1
· · ·M
l~x
i′q
i′qvq
|ΨN,~xEB 〉. (24)
Also from Eqs. (15) and (21) it can be seen that if j 6= l~xi
and v > 0 we always have
〈ΦN,~xB,k |M jiv|ΦN,~xB,k〉 = 0. (25)
With the above results, we can evaluate Eve’s con-
ditional state conditioned on Bob’s announcement. We
know that if Bob maps his state into the subspace M =
|β〉〈β| (for convenience we denote it by β) then Eve’s
state will collapse to the state
ρN,~x,βE =
trBMρ
N,~x
EBM
+
trEBMρ
N,~x
EBM
+
, (26)
where ρN,~xEB is the state Eve and Bob share before Bob’s
measurement [45]. In our security analysis we can con-
sider the worst case (favoring Eve), in which the state
ρN,~xEB is pure and described by |ΨN,~xEB 〉. For the pure state
case, Eq. (26) becomes
|ΨN,~x,βE 〉 =
∑
k
c~xk
√
〈ΦN,~xB,k |M |ΦN,~xB,k〉|ΦN,~xE,k 〉√
〈ΨN,~xEB |M |ΨN,~xEB 〉
(27)
where we have used Eq. (14) and the results that M =
M+ =MM+.
Bob’s announcement ~z corresponds to several possible
orthogonal subspaces given by
{S~j
~z,~v>0 = M
j1
c1(~z),v1
M j2
c2(~z),v2
· · ·M jw(~z)
cw(~z)(~z),vw(~z)
⊗|vac〉〈vac|
∣∣jq = 0, 1; vq > 0}, (28)
where ~j = {j1, j2, ..., jw(~z)}, ~v = {v1, v2, ..., vw(~z)}, ~v > 0
means all of its element vq is larger than zero, the element
M
jq
cq(~z),vq
corresponds to the measurement result that de-
tector DET
jq
cq(~z)
receives vq photons and |vac〉〈vac| de-
notes other detectors have not received any photon. The
7set of all operators S
~j
~z,~v>0’s only spans a subspace. From
Fig. 4 we can see that one mode coming from the
first pulse and one mode coming from the N -th pulse
are not detected by Bob (or the measurement results
of them are discarded by Bob). Therefore we need to
also consider Bob’s undetected subspace. We assume
Bob’s undetected subspace (or the measurement results
of which are discarded) is spanned by the orthogonal ba-
sis {|R1〉, |R2〉, ...}. Then all S~j~z,~v>0’s and |Ri〉’s make
up a complete set of projections for Bob. An announce-
ment ~z corresponds to several measurement results. Each
result corresponds to a collapsed state of Eve. Then
an announcement ~z collapses Eve’s state into a mixed
state made up by several pure state. For convenience,
we let Ri denote the projector |Ri〉〈Ri|. Then S~j~z,~v>0
is orthogonal to Ri. From Eqs. (3) and (25) we know
that for a given ~x, ~z, if ~j 6= ~l~x~z , it is always satisfied that
〈ΦN,~xB,k |S
~j
~z,~v>0|ΦN,~xB,k〉 = 0 and 〈ΦN,~xB,k |S
~j
~z,~v>0Ri|ΦN,~xB,k〉 = 0,
where the second equality comes from the fact that S
~j
~z,~v>0
is orthogonal to Ri. Then after we generalized Eq. (27)
to the multi-operator and multi-measurement-result case,
we know that if Bob’s announcement is ~z, then Eve’s con-
ditional state becomes
ρN,~x,~zE =
∑
~v>0,i
〈ΨN,~xEB |S
~l~x~z
~z,~v>0Ri|ΨN,~xEB 〉
P (~z|~x) (29)
·Proj(
∑
k
c~xk
√
〈ΦN,~xB,k |S
~l~x
~z
~z,~v>0Ri|ΦN,~xB,k〉|ΦN,~xE,k 〉√
〈ΨN,~xEB |S
~l~x
~z
~z,~v>0Ri|ΨN,~xEB 〉
)
where Proj(|Ψ〉) denotes the state |Ψ〉〈Ψ|,
P (~z|~x) =
∑
~v>0
〈ΨN,~xEB |S
~l~x~z
~z,~v>0|ΨN,~xEB 〉 (30)
describes the conditional probability of announcement ~z
for a given ~x, 〈ΨN,~xEB |S
~l~x~z
~z,~v>0|ΨN,~xEB 〉 gives the probability
of the measurement result corresponding to the operator
S
~l~x~z
~z,~v>0 and we have used the result that if
~j 6= ~l~x~z , then
〈ΨN,~xEB |S
~j
~z,~v>0Ri|ΨN,~xEB 〉 = 0.
It can be seen that for the detectorDET ji the projector
to the vacuum state, |vac〉〈vac|, can also be written as
M ji0. Then from Eqs. (23) and (28), it can be seen that
if w(~z) = w(~z′), then
〈ΦN,~xB,k |S
~l~x~z
~z,~v>0|ΦN,~xB,k〉 = 〈ΦN,~xB,k |S
~l~x
~z′
~z′,~v>0|ΦN,~xB,k〉,
〈ΦN,~xB,k |S
~l~x~z
~z,~v>0Ri|ΦN,~xB,k〉 = 〈ΦN,~xB,k |S
~l~x
~z′
~z′,~v>0Ri|ΦN,~xB,k〉,
(31)
where we have used results that the output mode d
l¯~xi
j is
a vacuum state and S
~j
~z,~v>0 is orthogonal to Ri.
We know that P (~z, ~x) = P (~z|~x) · P (~x), P (~x|~z) =
P (~z, ~x)/P (~z) and P (~z) =
∑
~x P (~z, ~x), so from Eqs. (14)
(30) and (31) it can be obtained that
P (~z|~x) = P (~z′|~x)
P (~z, ~x) = P (~z
′
, ~x)
P (~z) = P (~z′)
P (~x|~z) = P (~x|~z′)
(32)
for w(~z) = w(~z′).
By combining Eqs. (24), (29), (30), (31) and (32) we
obtain our final result:
Lemma 2 : If there is no bit error and w(~z) = w(~z′),
we always have
ρN,~x,~zE = ρ
N,~x,~z′
E
ρN,~zE = ρ
N,~z′
E
. (33)
The second equation in the Eq. (33) is derived from
Eq. (32) and the fact that ρN,~zE =
∑
~x P (~x|~z)ρN,~x,~zE .
Eq. (33) shows that Eve’s conditional state is only de-
termined by the total number of Bob’s detections and
is independent of the positions of the detections. This
means that only the weight of ~z matters, and we can use
this instead of ~z. In the following we introduce ρN,~x,tE to
denote the same conditional state that Eve holds for any
~z with weight t, i.e.,
t = w(~z)
ρN,~x,tE = ρ
N,~x,~z
E
. (34)
Here ρN,~x,tE can be regarded as Eve’s conditional state
while Bob only announces the total number of his detec-
tions.
With this new notation, we can simplify the expression
of the mutual information discussed in the following.
B. Discussion of Eve’s information
Since Eve’s state is invariant under the permutation of
~z, it is possible that Eve’s information about Alice’s bit
string can also be bounded by a term that only depends
on Bob’s total detection count (the weight of ~z). In this
subsection we upper bound Eve’s information about Al-
ice’s bit string by a term that is only conditioned on Bob’s
total detection count by applying the super-subadditivity
result proved in Appendix A. Then we give restrictions
on Eve’s information by using the fact that the maximum
information Eve can get on Alice’s bit string should be
no larger than the Holevo quantity [45] of the states sent
by Alice and the fact that the conditional mutual infor-
mation should be no larger than the entropy of Alice’s
modulation. With these restrictions it is possible for us
to give an upper bound to Eve’s information about Al-
ice’s bit string.
First we define
F (w) :=
∑
~z
P (~z|W = w)S(~L~z : E|~Z = ~z) (35)
8where we have introduced a variableW that can take the
value of w(~z) and P (~z|W = w) denotes the probability
of ~z when w(~z) = w.
From Eq. (8) we know that Eve’s information about
Alice’s bit string can be rewritten as
S(~UA : E|~Z) =
N−1∑
w=1
P (w)F (w). (36)
Now we will see that the F (w) is no larger than a term
that only depends on the total count w.
According to the definition of Von Neumann mutual
information [45], the mutual information between Alice
and Eve conditioned on Bob’s announcement ~z can be
given by
S(~L~z : E|~Z = ~z) = S(ρN,~zE )−
∑
~l~z
P (~l~z |~z)S(ρN,~l~z,~zE ) (37)
where P (~l~z |~z) is the probability that ~L~z takes the value
of ~l~z while ~Z = ~z,
ρN,
~l~z,~z
E =
∑
~x∈Γ(~l~z)
P (~x|~l~z, ~z)ρN,~x,~zE ,
Γ(~l~z) is the collection of all ~x’s that satisfy xci(~z) ⊕
xci(~z)−1 = (l~z)i and P (~x|~l~z, ~z) is the probability that ~X
takes the value of ~x while ~L~z = ~l~z and ~Z = ~z.
Also From Eq. (32) we know that the conditional
probability P (~x|~z) is actually only conditioned on the
weight of ~z, so we can introduce P (~x|w(~z)) to denote
P (~x|~z). Since ~l~z is part of ~l and ~l is generated from
~x, the conditional probability P (~l~z|~z) is also only condi-
tioned on the weight of ~z. Therefore we can also write
P (~l~z|~z) as P (~l~z|w(~z)) and P (~x|~l~z, ~z) as P (~x|~l~z, w(~z)),
where P (~x|~l~z, ~z) = P (~x,~l~z|~z)/P (~l~z|~z), and P (~l~z|w(~z)) de-
notes the probability that ~L~z takes the value of ~l~z while
W = w(~z). Then from Lemma 2 we know that ρN,
~l~z,~z
E
can be written as ρ
N,~l~z,w(~z)
E . Here, that the conditional
probabilities, P (~l~z|w(~z)) and P (~x|~l~z, w(~z)), and the con-
ditional state ρ
N,~l~z,w(~z)
E are conditioned on the weight of
~z means that they are conditioned on Bob’s announce-
ment of the total number of his detection count rather
than the actual detection positions.
Now we can use Lemma 2 to simplify S(~L~z : E|~Z = ~z)
and thus F (w). From Lemma 2 and Eq. (34) we know
that ρN,
~l~z,~z
E and ρ
N,~z
E in Eq. (37) can be replaced by
ρ
N,~l~z,w(~z)
E and ρ
N,w(~z)
E . Then S(
~L~z : E|~Z = ~z) becomes
S(~L~z : E|~Z = ~z) = S(ρN,w(~z)E )−
∑
~l~z
P (~l~z|~z)S(ρN,
~l~z,w(~z)
E )
= S(~L~z : E|W = w(~z)) (38)
where we have used the definition of the conditional Von
Neumann mutual information which says
S(~L~z : E|W = w) = S(ρN,wE )−
∑
~l~z
P (~l~z|w)S(ρN,~l~z,wE )
(39)
and the result P (~l~z |w) = P (~l~z |~z) for w = w(~z). Here
S(~L~z : E|W = w) is actually Eve’s information about ~L~z
while Bob only announces the total number of his counts.
It can be seen that Eve’s information about certain ~L~z
does not change if Bob publishes detailed position of his
detection or only the total number of his detection.
We know that the mutual information S(~L~z : E|W =
w(~z)) can also be given by
S(~L~z : E|W = w(~z)) (40)
= H(~L~z|W = w(~z))− S(~L~z|E,W = w(~z))
≤ w(~z)− S(~L~z|E,W = w(~z))
where we have used the fact that H(~L~z|W = w(~z)) ≤
w(~z).
Then by inserting Eqs. (38) and (40) to the expression
of F (w) given by Eq. (35) we can immediately get
F (w) ≤ w −
∑
~z
P (~z|W = w)S(~L~z |E,W = w) (41)
where we have used the fact that
∑
~z
P (~z|W = w) = 1.
In the following it can be seen that the last term in Eq.
(41) can be lower bounded by a term depending on Bob’s
total count, w.
The probability P (~z|W = w) for w(~z) = w in Eq. (41)
can be given by
P (~z|W = w) = P (~z)∑
~z′|w(~z′)=w
P (~z′)
=
1∑
~z′|w(~z′)=w
1
=
1
CwN−1
(42)
where in the second line we have used the Eq. (32), and
CwN−1 =
∑
~z′|w(~z′)=w
1 denotes the number of permutations
of w in N − 1.
Since ~L~z can be regarded as w(~z) selection from ~L,
which is composed of N − 1 elements, by using super-
subadditivity of entropy (which is proved in Appendix
A), we have
∑
~z|w(~z)=w
S(~L~z|E,W = w) ≥
wCwN−1
N − 1 S(
~L|E,W = w).
(43)
Then by combining Eqs. (41), (42) and (43), we can
obtain
F (w) ≤ w − w
N − 1S(
~L|E,W = w). (44)
9Finally, from Eqs. (36) and (44) we know that Eve’s
information about Alice’s bit string satisfies
S(~UA : E|~Z) =
N−1∑
w=1
P (w)Fw
≤
N−1∑
w=1
P (w)w − 1
N − 1
N−1∑
w=1
P (w)wS(~L|E,W = w)
(45)
where we sum over w in the range of 1 to N − 1, because
the maximum value of w is N − 1 and Alice and Bob
discard the result while there is no detection.
Eq. (45) gives us an upper bound on Eve’s information
about Alice’s state, when there is no bit error. This upper
bound no longer depends on Bob’s counting positions
denoted by ~z. Now the remaining problem is to find
some practical restrictions, so that the upper bound of
Eve’s information can be calculated.
Since all possible w is within 0 and N − 1, it can be
seen that
N−1∑
w=0
P (w)S(~L|E,W = w) = S(~L|E,W ). (46)
In the following we will see that if S(~L|E,W ) can be lower
bounded, then S(~UA : E|~Z) can be upper bounded.
According to the definition of mutual information,
S(~L|E,W ) can be expressed as
S(~L|E,W ) = H(~L)− S(~L : E,W )
= N − 1− S(~L : E,W ) (47)
where H(~L) = N − 1, and S(~L : E,W ) is the mutual
information between ~L and the combination of Eve and
system W .
Since ~L is generated from X and li = xci⊕xci−1, given
x1 and ~l, we can completely reconstruct ~x. Therefore, we
have
S(~L,X1 : E,W ) = S( ~X : E,W ). (48)
Because discarding a subsystem never increases the mu-
tual information [45], Eq. (48) leads to
S(~L : E,W ) ≤ S( ~X : E,W ). (49)
The term S( ~X : E,W ) is the mutual information be-
tween Alice and the combination of Eve and system
W . The system E, W can be regarded as a sys-
tem locally generated from the original state, ρ⊗NA =∑
~x P (~x)|ΨN~x 〉〈ΨN~x |, sent out by Alice. Since local oper-
ations cannot increase the mutual information, the max-
imum mutual information S( ~X : E,W ) should not be
bigger than the maximum information one can obtain
from the original state ρ⊗NA , which is upper bounded by
the Holevo quantity of ρ⊗NA [45]. The Holevo quantity of
ρ⊗NA is given by NS(A), where
S(A) = h[
1
2
(1− |〈−α|α〉|)] (50)
is the entropy of a single state ρA =
1
2 |−α〉〈−α|+ 12 |α〉〈α|
and h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function [44, 45]. Now we know that
S(~L : E,W ) ≤ NS(A). (51)
Then from Eqs. (46), (47) and (51), we can derive the
final constraint on Eve’s conditional entropy, which is
given by
N−1∑
w=1
P (w)S(~L|E,W = w) ≥ (52)
(N − 1)[1− P (w = 0)]−NS(A) =: K.
where we have used the fact that S(~L|E,W = 0) ≤
S(~L) = N−1, and K denotes the first term in the second
line.
Eq. (52) gives one constraint on S(~L|E,W = w).
There is also another trivial constraint on S(~L|E,W =
w), which is
S(~L|E,W = w) ≤ S(~L) = N − 1. (53)
Then the remaining problem is to upper bound Eve’s
information (or to lower bound the secret key rate) under
the constraints given by Eqs. (52) and (53).
C. Lower bound of the secret key rate
In this part we will give the lower bound of the secret
key rate based on the above analysis. From Eq. (7)
it can be seen that if there is no bit error, the mutual
information between Alice and Bob is
I(~UA : ~UB|~Z) =
∑
~z
P (~z)[H(~L~z|~Z = ~z)
−H(~L~z|~Y~z, ~Z = ~z)] =
∑
~z
P (~z)H(~L~z|~Z = ~z)
where we have used the fact that if there is no bit er-
ror H(~L~z|~Y~z, ~Z = ~z)] = 0. After the channel estima-
tion Alice and Bob can compute this mutual informa-
tion. It can be seen that if for all ~zs, ~L~z is evenly dis-
tributed, this mutual information becomes maximized,
and I(~UA : ~UB|~Z) =
∑
~z P (~z)w(~z). For simplification, in
the following we introduce a term ∆ to denote the differ-
ence between Bob’s actual information and the maximal
information he can get in principle:
∆ =
∑
w
P (w)w − I(~UA : ~UB|~Z). (54)
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Then from Eqs. (7), (45) and (54) we know that if there
is no bit error the secret key rate per N pulses satisfies
G ≥ 1
N − 1
N−1∑
w=1
P (w)wS(~L|E,W = w)−∆ (55)
where P (w) and ∆ are known after the channel estima-
tion.
It can be seen that under the constraints of Eqs. (52)
and (53), the lower bound of the secret key rate given by
Eq. (55) reaches its minimum when S(~L|E,W = w) = 0
for large values of w and S(~L|E,W = w) = N − 1 for
small values of w while satisfying Eq. (52) at the same
time. Then the final lower bound on the secret key rate
per N pulses is given by
G ≥
w0∑
w=1
P (w)w −∆ (56)
where the w0 is the solution to the equations

w0∑
w=1
P (w)(N − 1) ≤ K
w0+1∑
w=1
P (w)(N − 1) ≥ K
(57)
where K is defined in the Eq. (52). This formula for
the key generation rate in Eq. (56) is applicable to any
N any distribution in Bob’s detection statistics. In the
next section, we will consider a particular distribution as
an example.
V. SECRET KEY RATE UNDER THE
BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION CASE
We illustrate how to compute the key generation rate
in Eq. (56) derived in the previous section for a channel
that produces a binomial distribution in Bob’s detection
statistics. We show that in this case the secret key gener-
ation rate per pulse is linearly proportional to the channel
transmission probability (see Eq. (65)).
Consider the specific case where Bob’s total count
obeys the binomial distribution, ∆ = 0 and N → ∞.
Under this case
P (w) = CwN−1r
w(1− r)N−w−1 (58)
where r denotes the detection rate per pulse.
For the N → ∞ case, the binomial distribution tends
to the Gaussian distribution with the same mean and
variance as P (w). For convenience of discussion of the
N → ∞ case, here we introduce λ denote the ratio of w
over N − 1:
λ =
w
N − 1 .
Under the case that N →∞, the λ can be regarded as a
real number. Then instead of dealing with the Gaussian
approximation of P (w) we can deal with an approxima-
tion for P (λ), which denotes the distribution of λ. The
Gaussian approximation of P (λ) can be directly given by
P (λ) ≈ N − 1√
2π(N − 1)r(1 − r) exp[−
(N − 1)(r − λ)2
2r(1 − r) ]
(59)
which has the same mean and variance as P (λ).
The lower bound of the secret key rate given by Eq.
(56) can be approximated by
G ≥ (N − 1)
λ0∫
0
dλP (λ)λ (60)
where the λ0 = w0/(N − 1), which can be given by the
solution to the equation
λ0∫
0
dλP (λ) =
K
N − 1 (61)
Here Eq. (61) is obtained by putting λ into Eq. (57).
It can be seen that when N → ∞, we have P (w =
0) = 0 and N
N−1 = 1. Then Eq. (61) becomes
λ0∫
0
dλP (λ) = 1− S(A) (62)
To find a solution to Eqs. (60) and (62), we introduce
another function F (λ):
F (λ) =
{
P (λ), while λ ≤ λ0
0 while λ > λ0
. (63)
Then it can be seen that when N →∞,
∞∫
−∞
dλF (λ) = 1− S(A)
F (λ) = 0 for λ 6= r
where the expression in the second line can be seen from
the fact that limN→∞
N√
2πNr(1−r)
exp[−N(r−λ)22r(1−r) ] = 0 for
λ 6= r.
We see that F (λ) is actually a delta function satisfying
F (λ) = [1 − S(A)]δ(λ − r). From Eqs. (60) and (63),
we can finally get the secret key rate for the binomial
distribution and N →∞ case. It is given by
G ≥ (N − 1)
∞∫
−∞
dλF (λ)λ (64)
= (N − 1)r[1 − S(A)].
When given that the amplitude of coherent state is
α and the total transmission probability is η, then the
secret key rate per pulse can be given by
g ≥ η|α|2{1− h[ 1
2
(1− e−4|α|2)]} (65)
11
where we have used Eq. (50), the result that |〈−α|α〉| =
e−4|α|
2
and the factor N−1 is canceled since this is a key
rate per pulse. From this result it can be seen that the
lower bound of the secret key rate per pulse is linearly
proportional to the channel transmission probability. It
can be calculated that when α = 0.338, the right part in
the Eq. (65) is maximized and is given by 0.0357η. Note
that our result is consistent with the upper bounds on the
key rate given in Refs. [30, 33]. From Ref. [11], one can
easily find that the key generation rate per tranmistted
pulse of BB84 in the noiseless case scales at a higher
rate than that of DPSQKD. However, the overall secret
key generation rate is also determined by the modulation
rate, and we remark that it is possible that DPSQKD can
outperform BB84 in the modulation rate, since DPSQKD
only requires one binary phase modulation at Alice’s side,
while BB84 requires a quaternary modulator at Alice’s
side and a binary or quaternary modulator at Bob’s sides
[46] (the binary modulation is easier to realize than the
quaternary one.).
VI. CONCLUSION
We prove the security for DPSQKD with a weak-
coherent light source against collective attacks in the
noiseless case. The only assumption we employ are that
the quantum theory is true, the device is trusted and
the key size is infinite. The key point that guarantees
this scheme to be secure is that Eve’s state is indepen-
dent of the positions of Bob’s detections, so that after the
post-selection, in which Alice and Bob discard the data
that Bob did not receive a signal for, Bob knows Alice’s
sifted data better than Eve does. In addition, we consider
a specific case where the total number of Bob’s count
obeys the binomial distribution. In this case, we derive
the lower bound of the secret key rate per pulse and it is
linearly proportional to the channel transmission proba-
bility. This result definitely suggests that DPSQKD has
a high potential for high speed communication, since it is
easy to engineer DPSQKD to operate at a high modula-
tion rate. Although we have only proved the security of
DPSQKD for the noiseless case, we hope that our work
can offer some insights into the security of DPSQKD and
may serve as a stepping stone for proving the security for
the noisy case.
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APPENDIX A: SUPER SUBADDITIVITY FOR
THE MULTI-SYSTEM CASE
Theorem 1. Suppose Θn = {A1, . . . , An} is a collection
of n systems and Ξnm is a collection of all possible m se-
lections from n cases. Then it is always true for arbitrary
n and m ≤ n that
∑
~i∈Ξnm
S(Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Aim |E) ≥ Cm−1n−1 S(A1, A2, . . . , An|E)
(A1)
where ~i = (i1, i2, . . . , im), E is another system, and
Cmn =
n!
m!(n−m)! .
This theorem is a generalization of the following lemma
for subadditivity of Von Neuemann entropy (see, e.g.,
[45]).
Lemma 1. For three quantum systems A1, A2, and E,
S(A1|E) + S(A2|E) ≥ S(A1, A2|E).
Proof of Theorem 1. We will use induction to prove the
theorem. First, notice that for m = n, this theorem is
always true. In the following we will prove that for n and
m = 1 this theorem holds, which will be called first proof
(FP) in the following.
Then we prove if for n and m and m− 1 (m > 1) the
above theorem is correct, then for n+ 1 and m it is also
correct, which will be called second proof (SP).
Thirdly, we will prove that if for n− 1 and m = n− 2
(n > 2) the above theorem is true then for n and m+ 1
it is also valid, which will be called third proof (TP).
Since for n = 2 and m = 1, the above theorem is true,
then it is also true for n = 3 and m = 2 by applying the
TP.
This theorem is true for n = 3 and m = 2 and n = 3
and m = 1. Then by applying the SP, we know that it is
also valid for n = 4 and m = 2 and consequently for all
of n and m = 2.
After we continuously do such induction we can see
that if FP, SP and TP is correct then for all n ≥ m the
above theorem holds.
Now we prove the FP first. Observe that for arbitrary
n and m = 1, Eq. (A1) holds by repeated applications of
Lemma 1, i.e.
n∑
i=1
S(Ai|E) ≥ S(A1, A2, . . . , An|E) (A2)
holds.
Now we will prove the SP, which is claims that if for
n and m and m − 1 the above theorem holds, then for
n+ 1 and m it also holds.
We assume that Θn+1 = {A1, ..., An, An+1} =
{A1, ..., An, B}. Here we use B to denote An+1.
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In the following we use Ξnm to denote the collection of
all possible m selections in n samples.
First we have
T =
∑
~i∈Ξn+1m
S(Ai1 , Ai2 , ..., Aim |E)
=
∑
~i∈Ξnm
S(Ai1 , Ai2 , ..., Aim |E)
+
∑
~i∈Ξnm−1
S(Ai1 , Ai2 , ..., Aim−1 , B|E)
= C +D (A3)
where ~i = (i1, i2, ..., im) denotes a possible m selection
in n cases and we introduced T , C and D to denote the
terms given in the first, second and third line respectively.
If the theorem is valid for n and m, then we have
C ≥ mC
m
n
n
S(A1, A2, ..., An|E). (A4)
Now, D can also be given by
D =
∑
~i∈Ξnm−1
S(Ai1 , Ai2 , ..., Aim−1 |BE) + Cm−1n S(B|E)
= D1 + C
m−1
n S(B|E) (A5)
where we have applied the fact that S(A|EB)+S(B|E) =
S(AB|E) and ∑
~i∈Ξnm−1
= Cm−1n . Also, if the above theo-
rem is correct for n and m− 1, we have
D1 ≥ (m− 1)C
m−1
n
n
S(A1, A2, ..., An|BE). (A6)
Here,
Cmn =
n!
m!(n−m)! . (A7)
Then if we put Eqs. (A4), (A5), (A6) and (A7) into Eq.
(A3) we can immediately get
T ≥ n!(n−m+ 1)m
nm!(n−m+ 1)! [S(A1,A2,..., An|E) + S(B|E)] (A8)
+
n!m(m− 1)
nm!(n−m+ 1)! [S(A1, A2, ..., An|BE) + S(B|E)].
Since the above theorem is correct for n = 2 and m =
1, we have
S(A1,A2,..., An|E) + S(B|E) ≥ S(A1,A2,..., An, B|E).
(A9)
Then if we put Eq. (A9) into Eq. (A8) and apply the
results that S(A|EB) + S(B|E) = S(AB|E) and
n!m(m− 1)
nm!(n−m+ 1)! =
mCmn+1
n+ 1
,
we can obtain
T ≥ mC
m
n+1
n+ 1
S(A1, A2, ..., An, B|E)
which says that if for n and m and m − 1, the above
theorem is correct then for n+1 and m it is also correct.
Now the SP is proved.
Now, we will prove the TP, that is if for n − 1 and
m = n− 2 (n > 2) the above theorem is true then for n
and m+ 1 it is also true.
We assume that Θn = {A1, ..., An−1, B}. Here we use
B to denote An. Then we have that
S =
∑
~i∈Ξnm+1
S(Ai1,Ai2,..., Aim , Aim+1 |E)
= S(A1,A2, ..., An−1|E)
+
∑
~i∈Ξn−1m
S(Ai1 , Ai2 , ..., Aim , B|E)
= S1 + S2 (A10)
where the S, S1 and S2 are introduced to denote the
expression in the first, second and third line respectively,
and in the second line we have used the requirement that
m = n− 2.
Since S(A|EB) + S(B|E) = S(AB|E), and ∑
~i∈Ξn−1m
=
Cmn−1,
S2 =
∑
~i∈Ξn−1m
S(Ai1,Ai2,..., Aim |BE) + Cmn−1S(B|E)
≥ mC
m
n−1
n− 1 S(A1,A1,..., An−1|BE) + C
m
n−1S(B|E)
= m[S(A1,A1,..., An−1|BE) + S(B|E)] + S(B|E)
= mS(A1,A1,..., An−1, B|E) + S(B|E) (A11)
where we have applied the assumption that for n − 1
and m the above theorem is correct and the fact that
Cmn−1 = n− 1 for m = n− 2.
Now we put Eq. (A11) in to Eq. (A10) we can obtain
that
S ≥ mS(A1,A1,..., An−1, B|E)
+S(A1,A2, ..., An−1|E) + S(B|E)
≥ (m+ 1)S(A1,A1,..., An−1, B|E)
=
(m+ 1)Cm+1n
n
S(A1, A2, ..., An−1, An|E)
where in the third line we have used the subadditivity for
n = 2 and m = 1 case. Now the TP is proved.
Since the assumptions FP, SP and TP hold and the
initial conditions are satisfied, it is proved that for all
n ≥ m the above theorem holds.
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